Epstein Secrets

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

utenant, the SIS Lieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, and CO 1. The Staff Psychologist also completed a "Post-Watch Report," which stated that the "SHU L[ieutenant] informed inmate Epstein needs to be

alized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centr

utenant, the SIS Lieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, and CO 1. The Staff Psychologist also completed a “Post-Watch Report,” which stated that the “SHU L[ieutenant] informed inmate Epstein needs to b

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

utenant, the SIS Lieutenant, the Day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant, and CO 1. The Staff Psychologist also completed a "Post-Watch Report," which stated that the "SHU L[ieutenant] informed inmate Epstein needs to be