Epstein Secrets

f two depositions, the defendant knowingly made false material declarations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The defendant moves to dismiss those Counts, arguing that the Court can determine now—on a pre- 44 For similar reasons, the defendant's request for discovery regarding this matter should be den

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

f two depositions, the defendant knowingly made false material declarations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The defendant moves to dismiss those Counts, arguing that the Court can determine now—on a pre- 44 For similar reasons, the defendant's request for discovery regarding this matter should be den

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. ." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, 461 F. Supp. at 797). Finally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the crimes charged—which they do—this s

f two depositions, the defendant knowingly made false material declarations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The defendant moves to dismiss those Counts, arguing that that the Court can determine now—on a pre-trial record that is not factually developed—that the questions were fundamentally ambiguous

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePahna, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o