Epstein Secrets

). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

irectly rebutting the defendant's allegations, there is no material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. The defendant cites Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to suggest that a hearing is somehow warranted, but her motion falls far short of the Franks standard to obtain a hearing. "W

ucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) Richardson v. Marsh, 165 116 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 (1897) 296 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) 229 Rutenber

20 (2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Assn, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170,171 Gatlo, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. Co

ed). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct am egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 (1897) 296 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) 229 Rutenber

(2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170, 171 Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. C

d). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 (1897) 296 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) 229 Rutenber

(2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170, 171 Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. C

d). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 (1897) 296 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) 229 Rutenber

(2d Cir. 1928) 45 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) 140, 146 Flagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) 143 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) 166, 169, 170, 171 Gatto, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK) 275 Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) 125 Graham v. C

d). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi

tain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the affidavit, (ii) "the alleged falsehoods or omissions were nece