Epstein Secrets

ed States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 124, 132 United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 228, 229, 231 United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 180, 190 United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 170 EFTA00099963 United States v. Sweig, 441

14 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116,118 Ratzlal.v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) Richardson v. Marsh, 165 116 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencr

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience

States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 87, 93, 94 United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 151, 152, 153 United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 120, 127 United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 115 United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d C

439 U.S. 128 (1978) 82, 83 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 112 vii EFTA00095074 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 83 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 142 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 114, 116 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 105 Rosencrans v. Uni

e amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence d

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience