Epstein Secrets

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ed States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 124, 132 United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 228, 229, 231 United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 180, 190 United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 170 EFTA00099963 United States v. Sweig, 441

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ed States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 124, 132 United States v. Stringer, 730 E 3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 228, 229, 231 United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 180, 190 United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 170 EFTA00077628 United States v. Sweig, 441

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ed States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 124, 132 United States v. Stringer, 730 E 3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 228, 229, 231 United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 180, 190 United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 170 EFTA00039443 United States v. Sweig, 441

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

e amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence d

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ed States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) 124, 132 United States v. Stringer, 730 E 3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) 228, 229, 231 United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) 180, 190 United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) 170 EFTA00103021 United States v. Sweig, 441

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

amenable to multiple meanings, or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence de