Epstein Secrets

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

7) 274 United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011) 138 United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) 132 United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990) 256 United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993) 253 United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010) 123

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

017) 274 United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011) 138 United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) 132 United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990) 256 United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993) 253 United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010) 123

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

nfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes" with which the defendant has been charged. United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, as already discussed, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant and Epstein are n

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

017) 274 United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011) 138 United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) 132 United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990) 256 United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993) 253 United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010) 123

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

nfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes" with which the defendant has been charged. United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, as already discussed, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant and Epstein are n

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

nfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes" with which the defendant has been charged. United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, as already discussed, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant and Epstein are n

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

7) 274 United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011) 138 United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) 132 United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990) 256 United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993) 253 United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010) 123

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

nfairly prejudicial where it is not "any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes" with which the defendant has been charged. United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, as already discussed, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant and Epstein are n