Epstein Secrets

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. Lanam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lain hus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018) passim United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp.

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

therefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit 'omit[s] facts which, in retrospect, seem significant.'" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698,708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)); s

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018) passim United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

therefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit `omit[s] facts which, in retrospect, seem significant.'" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007));

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

236 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018) passim United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

therefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit `omit[s] facts which, in retrospect, seem significant.'" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007));

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

therefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit `omit[s] facts which, in retrospect, seem significant.'" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007));

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

36 United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) 183, 221, 222 United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) 254 United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 168 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018) passim United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 85

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

therefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit `omit[s] facts which, in retrospect, seem significant.'" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007));