Epstein Secrets

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ed States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) 48 United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 155 United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) 262 United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 268 United St

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

aja, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[M]ultiplicity is properly addressed by the trial court at the sentencing stage."); United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *1 I (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) ("To the extent that the Indictment alleges more than one conspiracy .. .

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ted States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) 48 United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 155 United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) 262 United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 268 United St

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

afa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[M]ultiplicity is properly addressed by the trial court at the sentencing stage."); United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) ("To the extent that the Indictment alleges more than one conspiracy . . .

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ted States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) 48 United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 155 United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) 262 United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 268 United St

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

afa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[M]ultiplicity is properly addressed by the trial court at the sentencing stage."); United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) ("To the extent that the Indictment alleges more than one conspiracy . . .

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

afa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[M]ultiplicity is properly addressed by the trial court at the sentencing stage."); United States v. Ghavami, 10 Cr. 1217 (ICMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) ("To the extent that the Indictment alleges more than one conspiracy . . . ,

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

ted States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) 48 United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 155 United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) 262 United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 268 United St

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

afa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[M]ultiplicity is properly addressed by the trial court at the sentencing stage."); United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) ("To the extent that the Indictment alleges more than one conspiracy . . .