Epstein Secrets

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

t privilege is not concerned `with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Id. (quoting Elsiad, 470 U.S. at 305). For this reason, even "[t]he most outrageous 98 EFTA00077730 behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

t privilege is not concerned `with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Id. (quoting Elsiad, 470 U.S. at 305). For this reason, even "[t]he most outrageous 98 EFTA00039545 behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

t privilege is not concerned `with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'" Id. (quoting Elsiad, 470 U.S. at 305). For this reason, even "[t]he most outrageous 98 EFTA00095190 behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a