Epstein Secrets

(8th Cir. 1968) 268 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) 123 Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2019) 302 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 254 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise", ), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36, 43, 44

.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 137 vii EFTA00099948 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 157, 174, 175 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 158 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 144 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 223

at is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaRam, 369 F.3d 153,156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's in

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

(8th Cir. 1968) 268 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) 123 Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2019) 302 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 254 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise", ), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36,43,44

.N.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 137 vii EFTA00077613 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 157, 174, 175 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 158 Minnesota v. Mwphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 144 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 223

at is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the July, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

(8th Cir. 1968) 268 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) 123 Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2019) 302 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 254 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise", ), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36,43,44

.N.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 137 vii EFTA00039428 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 157, 174, 175 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 158 Minnesota v. Mwphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 144 Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 223

at is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the July, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

at is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be

(8th Cir. 1968) 268 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) 123 Howell v. Superintendent Rockview Sc!, 939 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2019) 302 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 254 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise", ), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36,43,44

.Y. 2019) 150, 151 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) 137 vii EFTA00103006 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) 157, 174, 175 Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) 158 Minnesota v. Mwphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) 144 Murray v. Met Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) 223 N

at is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691- 92 (1988); United States v. LaP/am, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, evidence regarding the defendant's

eged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any prosecutor making "knowing use of false evidence." Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 F.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that "[e]ven where defense counsel is aware of the falsity, there may be