Epstein Secrets

against him"; and the Government did not seek the deposition "to aid it in a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding." Id. at 700; see also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (noting importance of policy concerns of Martindell wh

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

against him"; and the Government did not seek the deposition "to aid it in a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding." Id. at 700; see also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (noting importance of policy concerns of Martindell wh

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

against him"; and the Government did not seek the deposition "to aid it in a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding." Id. at 700; see also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (noting importance of policy concerns of Martindell wh

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initi

grand jury that had issued a alliena for the production of documents as parl'of an ongoing ation5). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

against him"; and the Government did not seek the deposition "to aid it in a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding." Id. at 700; see also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (noting importance of policy concerns of Martindell wh

er the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

ssued a "subpoena for the production of documents as part of an ongoing investigation." (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

against him"; and the Government did not seek the deposition "to aid it in a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding." Id. at 700; see also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (noting importance of policy concerns of Martindell wh

allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need."); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial

Parties' reliance."). 79 EFTA00100046 cau PPIal (Id. washy a granrad issulaubeaurnalMI an In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri where the Second Circuit, applying Martind ell, reversed the district court's decision granting the state Attorney General's motion to intervene to

her the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the government had made a showing of exceptionalcircumstances or a compelling need"); Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification o fprotective orders where district court did not make an "express finding" of improvidenc

To Be Filed Under Seal to use at a trial, rather than seeking information as part of a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding. See also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97-cv-7587, 1998 WL 88745, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) (Ville Government may not use its `awesome' investigati

al by motion to quash or modify the subpoena ... or to seek permissive intervention in the private action.") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the subject of the subpoena, w

er is "improvidently granted" where the presiding judge "reasonably should have recognized that [it] would facilitate or further criminal activity." Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 865-66. But there is absolutely no evidence that the district court harbored any such realization; indeed, at the time Judge Sweet ent

To Be Filed Under Seal to use at a trial, rather than seeking information as part of a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding. See also Botha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97-cv-7587, 1998 WL 88745, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) ("[T]he Government may not use its `awesome' investigat

l by motion to quash or modify the subpoena . .. or to seek permissive intervention in the private action.") (internal quotations omitted); but see Palmieri v. State of N. Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (considering appeal where the New York State Attorney General, rather than the subject of the s