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fitness theory (Seger 1981, Grafen 1985, 2006, Queller 1985, Taylor 1992b, Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998, Rousset & Billiard 2000, Rousset 2004, Taylor et al 2000, 2007b). In this paper, we explore the interaction between two strategies, A and B, given by the payoff matrix A B Ara b) B c d (

this is the probability that a newly introduced mutant, using a different strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Imhof Sc Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen et al 2006, Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium cond

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equivalent to PA C 1/N, where PA is the fixation probability of an A mutant in a population of B individuals (Nowak et al 2004a, Ohtsuki et al 2007, Imhof et al 2006, Lessard and Ladret 2007). The above condition can thus be interpreted as follows: in a 2 x 2 game with mixed strategies, pure strategy