Epstein Secrets

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) ("As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every af

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) ("As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every af

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) ("As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every af

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) ("As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every af

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) ("As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every af