Epstein Secrets

ts' claims of Government Franks violations. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the

tantial preliminary showing" requirement explained above exists to "avoid fishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN),

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

ts' claims of Government Franks violations. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the

tantial preliminary showing" requirement explained above exists to "avoid fishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN),

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

ts' claims of Government Franks violations. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the

tantial preliminary showing" requirement explained above exists to "avoid fishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN),

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

ts' claims of Government Franks violations. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the

tantial preliminary showing" requirement explained above exists to "avoid fishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN),

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

ts' claims of Government Franks violations. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing," United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were "inaccuracies or omissions" in the

tantial preliminary showing" requirement explained above exists to "avoid fishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. "[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN),

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable