Epstein Secrets

. 5, 2000) 264 United States v. Guerrier, 18 Cr. 284 (JSR) 286 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 300 United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) 261 United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014) 19 United States v.

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

s directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a multiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss multiplicitous count and noting that "[c]

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

. 5, 2000) 264 United States v. Guerrier, 18 Cr. 284 (JSR) 286 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 300 United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) 261 United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014) 19 United States v.

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

s directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a multiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank,No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss multiplicitous count and noting that "lc]o

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

. 5, 2000) 264 United States v. Guerrier, 18 Cr. 284 (JSR) 286 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 300 United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) 261 United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014) 19 United States v.

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

s directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a multiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank,No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss multiplicitous count and noting that "lc]o

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

s directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a multiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank, 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss multiplicitous count and noting that "[c]ourt

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

. 5, 2000) 264 United States v. Guerrier, 18 Cr. 284 (JSR) 286 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 300 United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) 261 United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014) 19 United States v.

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

s directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a multiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank, No. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to dismiss multiplicitous count and noting that "Ic]

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o