Epstein Secrets

on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their opinions!" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not permit an expert to "simply transmit that hearsay to the jury." Id. Rather, those underlyin

istinction—permitting cross-examination on drug use but excluding a formal diagnosis of addiction—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 F.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross- examination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but

on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their opinions!" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not permit an expert to "simply transmit that hearsay to the jury." Id. Rather, those underlyin

istinction—permitting cross-examination on drug use but excluding a formal diagnosis of addiction—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 F.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross- examination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but

on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their opinions!" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not permit an expert to "simply transmit that hearsay to the jury." Id. Rather, those underlyin

uch a distinction—permitting cross-examination on drug use but excluding a formal diagnosis ofilM—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 F.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross- examination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but