Epstein Secrets

e aprima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

d Cir. 2017) United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2004) United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) United States v. Chuang, 183 271 68, 81 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) 115, 116 United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke,

ule 16 of making "a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

the Fourth Amendment inquiry is "whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold question involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstr

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

d Cir. 2017) United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2004) United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) United States v. Chuang, 183 271 68, 81 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) 115, 116 United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke,

Rule 16 of making "a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

the Fourth Amendment inquiry is "whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold question involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstr

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

d Cir. 2017) United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2004) United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) United States v. Chuang, 183 271 68, 81 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) 115, 116 United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke,

Rule 16 of making "a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

the Fourth Amendment inquiry is "whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold question involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstr

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2004) 179 United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) 46, 55 United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) 82 United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) 105, 109, 111 United Stat

a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

d Cir. 2017) United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2004) United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) United States v. Chuang, 183 271 68, 81 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) 115, 116 United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 United States v. Coke,

ule 16 of making "a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-

the Fourth Amendment inquiry is "whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold question involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstr