Epstein Secrets

atively limited, due to the confidential nature" of the litigation. (Id. at 2 n.1). The Government also submitted that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test to evaluate the Government's ability to obtain access to materials covered by a protective order because (1) the Martindell balancin

nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 110 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 53 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 181 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 147 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 51 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) 1

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

Government could, on pain of criminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to answer falsely."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false statement prosecution; "[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a ci