Epstein Secrets

atively limited, due to the confidential nature" of the litigation. (Id. at 2 n.1). The Government also submitted that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test to evaluate the Government's ability to obtain access to materials covered by a protective order because (1) the Martindell balancin

ucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) Richardson v. Marsh, 165 116 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257 (1897) 296 Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) 229 Rutenber

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

d). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

d). The Second Circuit has explained: The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach wi