Epstein Secrets

and as detailed further below, members of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State's Attorney's Office, the U.S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"), and the FBI's Palm Beach Resident Agency (the "FBI Florida Office") conducted a separate investigation and prosecution of

oyed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

and as detailed further below, members of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State's Attorney's Office, the U.S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"), and the FBI's Palm Beach Resident Agency (the "FBI Florida Office") conducted a separate investigation and prosecution of

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

and as detailed further below, members of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State's Attorney's Office, the U.S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"), and the FBI's Palm Beach Resident Agency (the "FBI Florida Office") conducted a separate investigation and prosecution of

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

and as detailed further below, members of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State's Attorney's Office, the U.S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"), and the FBI's Palm Beach Resident Agency (the "FBI Florida Office") conducted a separate investigation and prosecution of

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

and as detailed further below, members of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Palm Beach State's Attorney's Office, the U.S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL"), and the FBI's Palm Beach Resident Agency (the "FBI Florida Office") conducted a separate investigation and prosecution of

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

ein and Maxwell!' Then, after Maxwell's two depositions, David Boies himself apparently approached the government in the summer of 2016, asking "if the Southern District would consider charging Maxwell with perjury." Brown, supra n.2. Said Mr. Boies: "We were saying to anyone who would listen: We've got clients who

eet.Com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) 12 Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, 20 Civ. 885 (SLC), 2020 WL 7239676 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2020) 12 United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) 16 United States v. Cortina, 630 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) 16 United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018)