Epstein Secrets

lete. Senior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed the MCC New York 10 p.m. institutional count, which showed that the SHU had 73 inmates assigned, whereas the Receiving and Discharge Department had zero inmates assigned to the unit. When questioned by the OIG about the 10 p.m. SHU count slip that listed '73 + 1" inmates and was signed by t

ical staff that he did not know what had caused his injuries, and that he went to drink a little water and woke up snoring. Later that morning, the MCC New York Staff Psychologist conducted a suicide risk assessment and determined that Epstein should remain on suicide watch. During the assessment, Epstein denied any knowledge

e. Senior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed the MCC New York 10:00 p.m. institutional count, which showed that the SHU had 73 inmates assigned, whereas the Receiving and Discharge Department had zero inmates assigned to the unit. When questioned by the OIG about the 10:00 p.m. SHU count slip that listed "73 + 1" inmates and was signed b

ical staff that he did not know what had caused his injuries, and that he went to drink a little water and woke up snoring. Later that morning, the MCC New York Staff Psychologist conducted a suicide risk assessment and determined that Epstein should remain on suicide watch. During the assessment, Epstein denied any knowledge

lete. Senior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed the MCC New York 10 p.m. institutional count, which showed that the SHU had 73 inmates assigned, whereas the Receiving and Discharge Department had zero inmates assigned to the unit. When questioned by the OIG about the 10 p.m. SHU count slip that listed “73 + 1” inmates and was signed by

ical staff that he did not know what had caused his injuries, and that he went to drink a little water and woke up snoring. Later that morning, the MCC New York Staff Psychologist conducted a suicide risk assessment and determined that Epstein should remain on suicide watch. During the assessment, Epstein denied any knowledg

lete. Senior Officer Specialist 6 reviewed the MCC New York 10 p.m. institutional count, which showed that the SHU had 73 inmates assigned, whereas the Receiving and Discharge Department had zero inmates assigned to the unit. When questioned by the OIG about the 10 p.m. SHU count slip that listed '73 + 1" inmates and was signed by t

ical staff that he did not know what had caused his injuries, and that he went to drink a little water and woke up snoring. Later that morning, the MCC New York Staff Psychologist conducted a suicide risk assessment and determined that Epstein should remain on suicide watch. During the assessment, Epstein denied any knowledge