Epstein Secrets

401 (2d Cir. 2004) 36, 43, 44 In re Grand Jucv Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991) 108, 113 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993) 140, 145 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1166 (1987) 136 In re Grand Jury Subpoena,

United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 240 United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982) 61, 65 United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1972) 183 EFTA00099951 United States v. Blakney, 941 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991) 205, 219 United States v. Blaszczak, 30

a witness against himself, within the meaning of the fifth amendment." (Det. Mot. 11 at 15) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, the Second Circuit ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of private papers that are not business d

scovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that"it m

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

scovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that "it

entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of im

scovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that "it

States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 166 In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. ("Enterprise"), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) 27, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991) In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, 28, 77, 33 81 1 F.3d 87 (2d

TA00095076 United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982) United States v. Birrell, 159 43, 45 470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1972) 122 United States v. Blakney, 941 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991) 138, 146 United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F

s the proper remedy.39 Indeed, none of the Second Circuit cases applying Martindell contemplate suppression as a remedy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d at 1224 (remanding for findings "on whether the protective order was improvidently granted or whether the gover

scovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that "it