Epstein Secrets

record again. The Electronics Technician told the OIG that he informed a Company 1 Technician that he had to obtain the drives from MCC New York's Computer Services Manager. The Electronics Technician further stated that he left the institution at the end of his shift and did not obtain the hard drives and did n

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra

record again. The Electronics Technician told the OIG that he informed a Company 1 Technician that he had to obtain the drives from MCC New York’s Computer Services Manager. The Electronics Technician further stated that he left the institution at the end of his shift and did not obtain the hard drives and did

alized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centr

record again. The Electronics Technician told the OIG that he informed a Company 1 Technician that he had to obtain the drives from MCC New York's Computer Services Manager. The Electronics Technician further stated that he left the institution at the end of his shift and did not obtain the hard drives and did n

ralized Control Center. Access into the SHU was further controlled by a second locked door (Main Interior Entry Door), to which a limited number of Correctional Officers (CO) had keys while on duty. Secondary access to the SHU was controlled by a locked door. That door was opened remotely by a staff member in the centra