Epstein Secrets

Judge Netbum, who had not yet ruled on the Government's other application in Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et at, 17 Civ. 0616 (JGK) (SN), of Chief Judge McMahon's decision via a pane and sealed letter. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. I). Subsequently, on April 16, 2019, Judge Netburn denied the Government's application. (

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

Judge Netbum, who had not yet ruled on the Government's other application in Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et at, 17 Civ. 0616 (JGK) (SN), of Chief Judge McMahon's decision via a pane and sealed letter. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. I). Subsequently, on April 16, 2019, Judge Netburn denied the Government's application. (

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

eir' ginndell in the altemalEMENty, both Challudge firTihron and rt ige that Martindell applied allialliEleappan under that framewial As chAllige McMahon found, even under the Martindell approach, testimony provided pursuant to a protective order can be divulged to a grand jury if the government estab

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

EFTA00095174 to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

Judge Netbum, who had not yet ruled on the Government's other application in Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et at, 17 Civ. 0616 (JGK) (SN), of Chief Judge McMahon's decision via a pane and sealed letter. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. I). Subsequently, on April 16, 2019, Judge Netburn denied the Government's application. (

th Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted."' United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights "are violated only when the challenged conduct invade

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi

e this is fine for you to disclose this in formation to the government based on the validly issued grand jury subpoena"); cf. (id. at 4 (Chief Judge McMahon describing Chemical Bank as saying "the proper procedure [for the production of documents] is for somebody to make a motion to be relieved from the

ent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Under the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment "does not prohi