Epstein Secrets

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide