Epstein Secrets

tion to undermining deterrence, a reasonable suspicion requirement will likely disincentivize agents to conduct laptop searches in close cases. See Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1522 (- To avoid liability" if required to find reasonable suspicion, "officers might be inclined not to conduct a thorough search i

hout resorting to case-by-case determinations of reasonable suspicion—determinations border patrol agents are ill-equipped to handle. See generally Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1522 (rejecting reasonable suspicion requirement for prison strip-searches under this rationale). Moreover, as a practical matter. s

ion is consistent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago,

ght to a jury chosen from the division where the offense was committed or from the entire district which includes that division."); United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46,49-50 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to a jury selected from the entire district o

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are

ght to a jury chosen from the division where the offense was committed or from the entire district which includes that division."); United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to a jury selected from the entire district

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required 'only where the charges of the indictment are

ght to a jury chosen from the division where the offense was committed or from the entire district which includes that division."); United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to a jury selected from the entire district

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required 'only where the charges of the indictment are

ght to a jury chosen from the division where the offense was committed or from the entire district which includes that division."); United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to a jury selected from the entire district

se at trial." United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Accordingly, "[a] bill of particulars is required `only where the charges of the indictment are