Epstein Secrets

ited States v. El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 23 United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) 62, 72 United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00099954 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

r. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, `unless the charged offenses am the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

ited States v. E!-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 23 United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) 62, 72 United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

ited States v. E!-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 23 United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) 62, 72 United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2

17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

nt to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, `unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

ictim-3's experiences in the Indictment "may not be stricken" "regardless of how prejudicial the language is ...." Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePalma, 461 F. Supp. at 797). the Indictment and in this memorandum, the Government has provided extensive detail regarding Minor Victim-3's anticipated

ited States v. El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 23 United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) 62, 72 United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00103012 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2

7 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241, 250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 165 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, `unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

ant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may not be stricken." Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001). "This standard is an exacting one, and o