Epstein Secrets

or can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore "arguably misleading by negative implication." Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when "the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial." United States v. Corr, 5

ual massages . . . [i]f you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss

or can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore "arguably misleading by negative implication." Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when "the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial." United States v. Corr, 5

ual massages . . . [i]f you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss

or can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore "arguably misleading by negative implication." Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when "the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial." United States v. Corr, 5

nt. 124 EFTA00095216 you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 (concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). Nor is there any basis to dismiss