Epstein Secrets

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) 145 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 110 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953) 53 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) 181 Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969) 147 Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124 (2008) 51 C

atively limited, due to the confidential nature" of the litigation. (Id. at 2 n.1). The Government also submitted that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test to evaluate the Government's ability to obtain access to materials covered by a protective order because (1) the Martindell balancin

or can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore "arguably misleading by negative implication." Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when "the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial." United States v. Corr, 5

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu

or can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore "arguably misleading by negative implication." Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when "the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial." United States v. Corr, 5

fy Rule 26(c) protective orders that precluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court need not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under Martindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netbu