Epstein Secrets

in power. Having no other major clients for its arms-export industry since the fall of Muammar Qadhafi, no other port of access for its navy in the Levant, and an affinity for a secular regime—however brutal—that bills itself as a bulwark against Sunni Arab religious extremism, Russia has deftly kept

during the Cold War, surviving a nuclear exchange may not be a priority EFTA00707184 for many extremist aggressors. As recently as September 30, the State Department reiterated the official US view that "We're not going to allow Iran to create a nuclear weapon." The carefully engineered June election of Hassan R

hided the US repeatedly for handing Iraq to Iran on "a silver platter." The brazen attempt by the Al Qaeda—affiliated Islamic State in Iraq and The Levant, ISIL, to seize control of Mosul confirms the Saudis' worst fears about lingering EFTA00665425 instability in Iraq. The Obama administration will

disengaged from actually ensuring that the provisions of the deal were implemented." In his book, The Dispensable Nation, Vali Nasr, who worked at the State Department at the time, notes that the "fragile power-sharing arrangement ... required close American management. But the Obama administration had no time or

can see that Alawite leadership will not leave power without a long and bloody fight. Recreating a sphere of Turkish-modeled Sunni influence in the Levant may be a long-term goal for Ankara, but the Turkish government is certainly not prepared to pay the near-term cost of civil strife in Syria spillin

ddle East and North Africa. One response that is often heard is a note of cautious optimism, captured in US President Barack Obama recent speech at the State Department when he referred to the "promise of the future." But sometimes we also hear the populist smears that have been applied to the Middle East for so l

Syria, that they do='t get a broader foothold," Mr. Obama said on Friday, using an alternative name for the group, the Islamic State=in Iraq and the Levant. "There are dangers of fierce sectarian fighting =f, for example, the terrorist organizations try to overrun sacred Shia sit=s, which could trigger

nstrating a new American =olicy and new determination. 11 EFTA_R1_02111349 EFTA02708702 As Anne-Marie Slaug=ter, director of policy planning in the State Department in Obama's first =erm, wrote in April 2014, "A U.S. strike=against the Syrian government now would change the entire dynamic. It would either force

he "Shia arc." Jordan and Egypt were natural fits. These predominantly Sunni countries were equally concerned with rising Iranian influence in the Levant and were determined to counter what they perceived as Tehran's outsized influence in the region. Yet Riyadh went a step further and aimed to also

ment Conference -- were hashed out. Establishing these relationships was fraught with complexity. Palestinian politicians, as well as many within the State Department, overly concerned themselves with the USSC's close relationship with Israel's security apparatus -- behaving as though Israel's presence in the We

Middle East and North Africa. One response that is often heard is a note of cautious optimism, captured in US President Barack Obama recent speech at the State Department when he referred to the "promise of the future." But sometimes we also hear the populist smears that have been applied to the Middle East for so long

s can see that Alawite leadership will not leave power without a long and bloody fight. Recreating a sphere of Turkish-modeled Sunni influence in the Levant may be a long-term goal for Ankara, but the Turkish government is certainly not prepared to pay the near-term cost of civil strife in Syria spilling