Epstein Secrets

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str

h suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

oth suppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the defendant, Flom v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied heavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the

the possibility of a severe sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See Jackson, 823 F.2d at 7; see also United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant was a flight risk because her knowledge of the seriousness of the charges against her gave her a str