Epstein Secrets

ant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of th

re the offense is alleged to have occurred and where the case will be tried." (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). Because the offense is alleged to have occuned in the "Manhattan Division" and the defendant assumes that her jury trial will occur there too, she argues that the "appropriate comparison," for the purpose of her fair cross

ant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of th

e the offense is alleged to have occurred and where the case will be tried." (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). Because the offense is alleged to have occurred in the "Manhattan Division" and the defendant assumes that her jury trial will occur there too, she argues that the "appropriate comparison," for the purpose of her fair cross

ant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of th

e the offense is alleged to have occurred and where the case will be tried." (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). Because the offense is alleged to have occurred in the "Manhattan Division" and the defendant assumes that her jury trial will occur there too, she argues that the "appropriate comparison," for the purpose of her fair cross

ant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of th

e the offense is alleged to have occurred and where the case will be tried." (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). Because the offense is alleged to have occurred in the "Manhattan Division" and the defendant assumes that her jury trial will occur there too, she argues that the "appropriate comparison," for the purpose of her fair cross

ant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of th

e the offense is alleged to have occurred and where the case will be tried." (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). Because the offense is alleged to have occurred in the "Manhattan Division" and the defendant assumes that her jury trial will occur there too, she argues that the "appropriate comparison," for the purpose of her fair cross