Epstein Secrets

r, on the following issues: (1) whether the lease unambiguously required that OFM's consent to an assignment or sublet be in writing, in which case Massey could not have orally consented, as a matter of law, to Epstein's sublet of the Premises to Fisher, (2) whether OFM was permitted under the lease to

l common law or state law applied because, in that case, federal law and state law led to the same result. See Kerin, 116 F.3d at 991. I agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, for two reasons. First, although Epstein and Fisher argue that a federal rule should be created to promote the creation of a uniform b

er, on the following issues: (1) whether the lease unambiguously required that OFM's consent to an assignment or sublet be in writing, in which case Massey could not have orally consented, as a matter of law, to Epstein's sublet of the Premises to Fisher, (2) whether OFM was permitted under the lease to

l common law or state law applied because, in that case, federal law and state law led to the same result. See Kerin, 116 F.3d at 991. I agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, for two reasons. First, although Epstein and Fisher argue that a federal rule should be created to promote the creation of a uniform bo

er, on the following issues: (1) whether the lease unambiguously required that OFM's consent to an assignment or sublet be in writing, in which case Massey could not have orally consented, as a matter of law, to Epstein's sublet of the Premises to Fisher, (2) whether OFM was permitted under the lease to

l common law or state law applied because, in that case, federal law and state law led to the same result. See Kerin, 116 F.3d at 991. I agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, for two reasons. First, although Epstein and Fisher argue that a federal rule should be created to promote the creation of a uniform bo