Epstein Secrets

light of the Company's decision to use valuation and risk models that did not reflect the impact of the housing crisis on its most important assets: MBS. 89 EFTA00316817 Case 1:08-cv-02793-RWS Document 102 Filed 02/27/09 Page 105 of 347 368. As set out in the 2008 OIG Report, TM concluded that

arties to refuse to lend to the Company. 470. Moreover, as the Company's CEO, Schwartz knew or was reckless in not knowing that on March 6, 2008, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it wouldn't renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. C. Samuel L. Mol

ermed asset-backed securities ("ABS"). When mortgages are packaged together for securitization, they are referred to as Mortgage Backed Securities ("MBS"), and when the mortgages are residential, those securities are referred to as Residential Mortgage Backed Securities ("RMBS"). 41. RMBS are, in

s; it claims to be an agency-only company. (So much for that concept.) 260. Bove's chagrin was shared by the Company's lenders. On March 6, 2008, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it wouldn't renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. That meant Raboban

he traders who were responsible for taking on additional risk. Bear Steams did not have risk managers that had experience or were capable of valuing MBS which were central to Bear Stearns' business models. (iii) Compliance With Rankine Regulations 731. In its third quarter 2007 Form 10-Q Bear Ste

een a problem. 792. At the time he made this statement, Schwartz, as the Company's CEO, was aware that on March 6, 2008, more than a week earlier, Rabobank Group, one of Bear Stearns' European lenders, told the brokerage that it would not renew a $500 million loan coming due later that week. He also knew tha