Epstein Secrets

to Bamford, it took nearly nine months to arrange the meeting. “I have been try- ing to set up an interview with him [Snowden]—traveling to Ber- lin, Rio de Janeiro twice, and New York multiple times to talk with the handful of his confidants who can arrange a meeting,” Bamford @ recounted in Wired. After my din

spector general, but the NSA also had to report to a different set of compliance officers at the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Justice. Additionally, the Department of Justice dispatched a team of lawyers every sixty days to review the results of “every

ng to Greenwald’s account, Snowden had given both him and Poitras identical copies of the NSA documents in Hong Kong. When Greenwald returned home to Rio de Janeiro, he found his copy was corrupted. But Poitras still had her digital copy of whatever stolen documents that Snowden had distributed to them. So Greenw

ion, or SCI. Such SCI material is considered so sensitive that it must be handled within formal access control systems established by the Director of National Intelligence. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020164 13 Nor did Snowden’s breach begin with him handing over classified documents to the Guardian reporters in Hong Kong in Jun

t his copy of the documents were corrupted, Poitras made a copy of the thumb drive that Snowden gave her in Hong Kong and sent it to her Greenwald in Rio de Janeiro by a courier. That courier was intercepted by British authorities at Heathrow Airport. When examined, the Poitras-Greenwald thumb drive contained som

we do in intelligence that, if revealed, would have the potential for all kinds of blowback,” -- National Intelligence” — James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence In the Game of Nations, which is played at a level that often is not visible to public scrutiny, the great prize is state secrets that reveal the hi