Epstein Secrets

Snowden’s liaisons with the Russian authorities while Wizner was handling the Snowden narrative, including selecting the media out- lets. Presumably, Wizner had handpicked Snowden’s past interview- ers in Moscow, including Barton Gellmna, James Bamford, Brian Williams, John Oliver, Alan Rusbridger, and Ka

awyer at the ACLU. He made it clear to me that the exposure of Snowden to journalists, or at least the vetting of journalists, had been outsourced to Wizner. Kucherena was handling Snowden’s liaisons with the Russian authorities while Wizner was handling the Snowden narrative, including selecting the medi

ing the NSA. In 2010, the NSA division that handled such security and espio- nage threats reportedly initiated a counterespionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters. According to a former NSA official, “They [were] looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA [was] convinced resided at Fort Meade a

adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Sev- eral hundred U.S. and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington, D.C., Fort Meade, Maryland, and Cheltenham, England, for months on end to determine which parts of the most powerful communications intelligence system in the world c

in early 2013, while Snowden was still working for the NSA, from Poitras. At that time, Poitras did not know Snowden’s real name, but she revealed to Wizner that she had found an anonymous source with access to U.S. government surveillance secrets. So he was not completely surprised when Glenn Greenwald,

IGHT_020291 140 When I later asked Kucherena in Moscow why Snowden changed his story in direct contradiction of what Kucherena had stated, he said “Wizner.” He was referring to Ben Wizner, a top-drawer ACLU lawyer based in Washington D.C. Wizner had joined the ACLU in August 2001 after graduating NYU la

the NSA. In 2010, the NSA’s “Q” division handled such security and espionage threats. It reportedly initiated a counter-espionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters on receiving the tip. But since the NSA’s cryptological service had in 2010 no fewer than 35,000 military and civilian contractor employ

le its adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Several hundred US and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington DC, Fort Meade, Maryland and Cheltenham, England for months on end to determine if which parts could be still salvaged from what had been until the Snowden breach t

013 while Snowden was still working for Dell at the NSA base in @ Hawaii. At that time, Poitras did not know Snowden’s real name, but @ she informed Wizner that she was in touch with a person identify- ing himself as a senior officer in U.S. intelligence. (Poitras did not know at that time that her sourc

ulu to Moscow. When I later asked Kucherena in Mos- cow why Snowden changed his story in direct contradiction of what Kucherena had stated, he said, “Wizner.” He was referring to Ben Wizner, Snowden’s ACLU lawyer in Washington, D.C. Wizner had joined the ACLU in August 2001 after graduating from NYU Law

ing the breach to a team headed by Richard “Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Opera- tions Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment inves- tigation because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under his