Epstein Secrets

atric Hospital No. 5 outside Moscow. There were also KGB spies in the NSA who were caught or died before they could defect. One of them was Sergeant Jack Dunlap. He was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning in his garage on July 23, 1963. Although there was no suicide note, his death was ruled an apparent s

ing the NSA. In 2010, the NSA division that handled such security and espio- nage threats reportedly initiated a counterespionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters. According to a former NSA official, “They [were] looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA [was] convinced resided at Fort Meade a

adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Sev- eral hundred U.S. and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington, D.C., Fort Meade, Maryland, and Cheltenham, England, for months on end to determine which parts of the most powerful communications intelligence system in the world c

and nuclear proliferation. The Snowden breach was not without precedent at the NSA. There had been two Russian spies at the NSA during the Cold War, Jack Dunlap and David Boone who took a limited number of documents, but no one since the end of the Cold War had taken a single NSA classified document. Now an i

the NSA. In 2010, the NSA’s “Q” division handled such security and espionage threats. It reportedly initiated a counter-espionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters on receiving the tip. But since the NSA’s cryptological service had in 2010 no fewer than 35,000 military and civilian contractor employ

le its adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Several hundred US and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington DC, Fort Meade, Maryland and Cheltenham, England for months on end to determine if which parts could be still salvaged from what had been until the Snowden breach t

and nuclear proliferation. The Snowden breach was not without precedent at the NSA. There had been two Russian spies at the NSA during the Cold War, Jack Dunlap and David Sheldon Boone, who took a limited number of documents, but no one since the end of the Cold War is known to have taken a single NSA classif

ing the breach to a team headed by Richard “Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Opera- tions Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment inves- tigation because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under his