Epstein Secrets

under tight surveillance—an operation that grew in complexity and expense as @ more SVR agents arrived in the United States. @ Meanwhile, in Moscow, Poteyev was following the unfolding operation. Part of his SVR job was to continue preparing these “Americans,” as they were called by the SVR, for their ass

ing the NSA. In 2010, the NSA division that handled such security and espio- nage threats reportedly initiated a counterespionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters. According to a former NSA official, “They [were] looking for one or more Russian spies that NSA [was] convinced resided at Fort Meade a

adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Sev- eral hundred U.S. and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington, D.C., Fort Meade, Maryland, and Cheltenham, England, for months on end to determine which parts of the most powerful communications intelligence system in the world c

leeper agents under tight surveillance—an operation which grew in complexity and expense as more SVR agents arrived in the US. Meanwhile, in Moscow, Poteyev was following the unfolding operation. Part of his SVR job was to continue preparing these “Americans,” as they were called by the SVR, for their ass

the NSA. In 2010, the NSA’s “Q” division handled such security and espionage threats. It reportedly initiated a counter-espionage probe at the NSA’s Fort Meade headquarters on receiving the tip. But since the NSA’s cryptological service had in 2010 no fewer than 35,000 military and civilian contractor employ

le its adversaries took full advantage of the setback. Several hundred US and British intelligence officers worked around the clock in Washington DC, Fort Meade, Maryland and Cheltenham, England for months on end to determine if which parts could be still salvaged from what had been until the Snowden breach t

telligence services ensnared and sacrificed recruits, as if playing a chess game, to advance their moles. Despite notable successes such as Felfe and Poteyev, a great number of these elaborate conspiracies fail to insinuate a mole into their adversaries’ confidence. Intelligence services therefore also tak

ing the breach to a team headed by Richard “Rick” Ledgett, who was then director of the NSA’s Threat Opera- tions Center at the NSA’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. Ledgett was the logical choice to head the damage assessment inves- tigation because the center’s regional branch in Hawaii was under his