Epstein Secrets

n moles eluded long, intensive investigations. Rob- ert Hanssen penetrated the FBI for over twenty years for the KGB without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames acted as a KGB mole @ in the CIA for more than ten years and passed all the CIA’s sophisti- @ cated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded

telligence services ensnared and sacrificed recruits, as if playing a chess game, to advance their moles. Despite notable successes such as Felfe and Poteyev, a great number of these elaborate conspiracies fail to insinuate a mole into their adversaries’ confidence. Intelligence services therefore also tak

TO SNOWDEN’S THEFT of NSA documents, the single most shattering blow to the confidence of the U.S. intelligence com- munity was the 1994 exposure of Aldrich Ames as a long-serving Russian mole in the CIA. Ames, it will be recalled, had been a high- ranking CIA officer, working at the CIA’s Counterintelligence

under tight surveillance—an operation that grew in complexity and expense as @ more SVR agents arrived in the United States. @ Meanwhile, in Moscow, Poteyev was following the unfolding operation. Part of his SVR job was to continue preparing these “Americans,” as they were called by the SVR, for their ass

d intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than ten years, and passed all the CIA’s sophisticated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded inte

leeper agents under tight surveillance—an operation which grew in complexity and expense as more SVR agents arrived in the US. Meanwhile, in Moscow, Poteyev was following the unfolding operation. Part of his SVR job was to continue preparing these “Americans,” as they were called by the SVR, for their ass