Epstein Secrets

ole of concealment must be taken into account when assessing information bearing on the work of espionage services. I learned when I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s legendary ex-counterintelligence chief of the CIA in the 1970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set

the newspaper. He was also highly-regarded by the editors there. He was therefore interested in Poitras’ offer (although he would consult a friend at the Justice Department about the legality of publishing NSA documents. Snowden now had laid the groundwork for at least two possible outlets; one an establishment newspape

Hong Kong, the FBI realized Snowden was a possible intelligence defector. It froze his credit and bank cards. It also notified the passport office in the State Department the legal attaches at the Hong Kong consulate. The legal attaches, who were actually FBI field agents posted in Hong Kong, located Snowden at the Mir

the service providers. It also requires a written directive from both the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, and a review by the Department of Justice every three months of each case. After obtaining this data, the NSA ran programs to filter out all domestic Internet communications. In theory at lea

. The role of concealment must be taken into account when assess- ing information bearing on the work of espionage services. When I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton—the CIA’s legendary ex- counterintelligence chief, active in the 1970s—for a book on decep- tion, I learned that intelligence services play by a diff

cy, there were six government employees who, as a matter of personal conscience, shared classified informa- tion they obtained from the FBI, the CIA, the State Department, and the U.S. Army with journalists. They were all convicted: Sha- mai Leibowitz in 2010, Chelsea Manning in 2013, John Kiriakou in 2013, Donald Sach

the service providers. It also required a written directive from both the attorney general and the director of national intelligence and a review by the Department of Justice every three months for each and every case. After obtain- ing this data, the NSA ran programs, as required by law, to filter out all domestic Interne

. When it comes to recruiting moles in a larger universe, intelli- gence services operate much like highly specialized corporate “head- hunters,” as James Jesus Angleton described the process to me during the Cold War era. He was referring to the similar approach that cor- porate human resource divisions had with espi

intelligence targets for the NSA to pursue. As the Cold War heated up in the 1960s, the NSA provided intel- ligence not only to the Pentagon but to the Department of State, the | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 199 @ 9/30/16 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019687 200 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS Central Intelligenc