Epstein Secrets

. The role of concealment must be taken into account when assess- ing information bearing on the work of espionage services. When I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton—the CIA’s legendary ex- counterintelligence chief, active in the 1970s—for a book on decep- tion, I learned that intelligence services play by a diff

that Snowden had given to Poitras and Greenwald. This discovery came when British authorities, under Schedule 7 of Britain’s Terrorism Act, detained David Miranda, Greenwald’s romantic partner, at Heathrow Airport. Miranda was suspected of acting as a courier for Greenwald and Poitras. Accord- ing to Greenwald’

. When it comes to recruiting moles in a larger universe, intelli- gence services operate much like highly specialized corporate “head- hunters,” as James Jesus Angleton described the process to me during the Cold War era. He was referring to the similar approach that cor- porate human resource divisions had with espi

tras could hardly rely on these five confidants not to tell her secrets (and Snowden’s) to others. Hours after he was told, Greenwald told his lover, David Miranda, about the source in great detail. He even asked him to evaluate the source’s bona fides for him. Gellman, for his part, raised the matter with a for

ole of concealment must be taken into account when assessing information bearing on the work of espionage services. I learned when I was interviewing James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s legendary ex-counterintelligence chief of the CIA in the 1970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set

e investigators had the opportunity to examine the files that Snowden had actually given Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong. This discovery came when David Miranda, Greenwald’s romantic partner, was detained at Heathrow Airport by British Authorities under Schedule Seven of Britain’s Terrorism Act. At the time,