Epstein Secrets

Binney, the ex-NSA whistle-blower, and Jacob Appelbaum. In April 2012, for example, she made a pre- sentation at the Whitney Museum in New York with Binney and Appelbaum. She had become such a leading activist against the NSA by December 2012 that Appelbaum, after lauding her work, inter- | | Epst_97804

contingent of “legal attachés” based at the consulate to pursue many possible violations of U.S. law including video piracy. In addition, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had retained a handful of “China watchers” under diplomatic cover in Hong Kong. This group constituted the “intelligence mission,” as he referr

owed her rise in this world. By simply googling Poitras’ name in January 2013, he would have learned about her connections with Greenwald, Appelbaum, Binney, Assange and other leading figures in the anti-surveillance camp. When asked later Snowden why he had chosen her to help him, He replied “I didn’t. Y

ained that the FBI had a contingent of “legal attaches” based at the consulate to pursue, among other things, video pirates. In addition, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency had a handful of “China-watchers” in HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020163 [2 Hong Kong. This group constituted the intelligence “mission,” as he referred to it.

ious NSA whistle-blowers, William E. Binney, Thomas A. Drake, and Russell D. Tice, but Snowden’s case differed from those cases in an important ways. Binney, Drake, and Tice had not intentionally taken any NSA documents. Snowden, on the other hand, had not only taken a large NSA documents but released ten

Snowden. “It is inconceivable to me that his co-workers would divulge their passwords to him,” a former Booz Allen executive, who had also worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency, told me. “If he was a system administrator he might trick a threat analyst into entering his password into his computer under the pretext that he ne