Epstein Secrets

ell was transferring files held at Fort Meade to backup computers in Hawaii. He “was moving copies of that data there for them,” said Deputy Director Ledgett, “which was perfect cover for stealing the [NSA] data” through the fall and winter of 2012. The security mea- sures at the Hawaii base presented no o

contingent of “legal attachés” based at the consulate to pursue many possible violations of U.S. law including video piracy. In addition, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had retained a handful of “China watchers” under diplomatic cover in Hong Kong. This group constituted the “intelligence mission,” as he referr

position since the top- secret unit was responsible for discovering and countering the threats posed by Chinese, Russian and other adversary nations. Ledgett was also the logical choice to head the damage assessment investigation since the Center’s regional branch in Hawaii was from where highly-sensitive

ained that the FBI had a contingent of “legal attaches” based at the consulate to pursue, among other things, video pirates. In addition, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency had a handful of “China-watchers” in HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020163 [2 Hong Kong. This group constituted the intelligence “mission,” as he referred to it.

se “bread crumbs” were missed by the NSA according to its statement. It is within the realm of possibility that the NSA Damage Assessment team under Ledgett falsified its finding to inflate the number of documents that Snowden stole. NSA executives also might have lied to Congress to the same end. But why

Snowden. “It is inconceivable to me that his co-workers would divulge their passwords to him,” a former Booz Allen executive, who had also worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency, told me. “If he was a system administrator he might trick a threat analyst into entering his password into his computer under the pretext that he ne