Epstein Secrets

422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States'. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (I I* Cir. 2004), judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 115 S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United Stalest Grego, 363 F.3d 1093 (II* Cir. 2004); United States'. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (I I lb Cir. 200

tions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalize

§2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (II d' C' . 2004),judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 1 S. Ct. 338 (2006); United States Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (II* Cir. 2 3); Uni

tions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalize

er §2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11ih 2004), judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 12, S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United States' Orrega, 363 F.3ds1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2003)

tions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalize

2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 338 (2006); United States !Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (I I" Cir. 2004); United States "'Miranda, 348 17.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 20

ctions to prosecute acts— such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalize

422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (I Is Cir. 2004),judgment vacated for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (I 1* Cir.

tions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalize

2422(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004),judgment varied for Booker consideration, 125 S. Ct. 1338 (2006); United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (11° Cir. 2

tions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalize