Epstein Secrets

knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by falsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the qu

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by falsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the qu

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by falsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the qu

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by falsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the qu

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by falsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the qu

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable