Epstein Secrets

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the firstFranks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showingof a false statement or om

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "'[a]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily co

he defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to rem

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

he defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to rem

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

he defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to rem

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

he defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to rem

ns [were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a defendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement or

o omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 (emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is therefore not necessarily con

he defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to rem