Epstein Secrets

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c Applications, R.J. Aumann Sc S. Hart (ed.). [44] Harsanyi, J. C., Selten, R. 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. MIT Press: Cambridge MA. EFTA00749008 Bibliography 142 [45] Hassell MP, Comins HN, May RM, 1994. Species coexistence and self-organizing spa- tial dynamics. Nature, 370

, Nowak, M.A., Hauert C., 2008. Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs: Efficent Method for Weak Selection. To be published. [35] Fudenberg, D. and Imhof, L. A., 2006. Imitation processes with small mutations. J. Econ. Theor., 131, 251-262. [36] Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambr

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