Epstein Secrets

an Dershowitz, Esq. November 19, 2007 Page 14 interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement.") (emphasis added); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was evidence ... that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.").' Under these standards, the

e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States v. Murrell 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (111b Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to crim

t be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement") (emphasis added)• Cleveland v, United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was evidence that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.").2 Under these standards, there i

e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Bailey 228 F.3d 637, 639 (02' Cu. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to crim

t be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement") (emphasis added)• Cleveland United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was evidence that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.").2 Under these standards, there is

(e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States'. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). See also United States Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (02' Cu. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to crimi

be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement.") (emphasis added); Cleveland I, United States 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was evidence ... that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.").2 Under these standards, there

(e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States'. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (1 I th Cir. 2004). See also United States'. Bailey 228 F.3d 637, 639 (61° Cir. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to cri

be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement.") (emphasis added); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was evidence ... that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive." ).r Under these standards, the

e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cu. 2004). See also United States v. Bailey 228 F.3d 637, 639 (61° Cir. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to crimi

T]he only factual issue in the case was whether paitioners dominant purpose in making the trip was to facilitate her practice of prostitution. . .); Cleveland I United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was evidence .. . that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive."). There is no basis for conc

61 (11th Cir. 1949); United States Rojas, 145 Fed. Appx. 647 (11th Cir. 05); United States I Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11'h Cir. 200 ). United States I Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004), is in the same mold, except that, in that tiling operation, the defendant communicated, not with the purported 13 y