Epstein Secrets

whether a witness was encouraged to speak, but whether his "free will," when he spoke, "was overborne." Id. at 188; see also, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2014). It follows that the Government need not inform a witness of the nature of its investigation, see United States

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question forpost hoc ambiguity,"Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable j

whether a witness was encouraged to speak, but whether his "free will," when he spoke, "was overborne." Id. at 188; see also, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2014). It follows that the Government need not inform a witness of the nature of its investigation, see United States

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

whether a witness was encouraged to speak, but whether his "free will," when he spoke, "was overborne." Id. at 188; see also, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2014). It follows that the Government need not inform a witness of the nature of its investigation, see United States

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

whether a witness was encouraged to speak, but whether his "free will," when he spoke, "was overborne." Id. at 188; see also, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2014). It follows that the Government need not inform a witness of the nature of its investigation, see United States

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable

whether a witness was encouraged to speak, but whether his "free will," when he spoke, "was overborne." Id. at 188; see also, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2014). It follows that the Government need not inform a witness of the nature of its investigation, see United States

rguments only underscore the principle that perjury prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable