Epstein Secrets

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta

d with a jury drawn from the "Long Island Division." Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise. The defendan

ntire district or from a particular geographic area within a district, such as the county or "division" where the offense was committed. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that defendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United Sta